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Interactions between Price and Price Deal
Purpose:

The purpose of this study was to examine the interactive
effect of price and price deal. Specifically, we wanted to
measure how consumers’ behavioral intentions toward the
brand are affected for a high-priced brand and a low-priced
brand when a price deal is offered.

Design/methodology/approach:

A two (price level: high versus low; between) by two (price
deal: absent versus 40% off; between) experimental design
was used. Study 1 tested the hypotheses for two existing
brands whereas Study 2 did so for a fictitious brand.

Findings:

The analysis confirmed a strong interactive effect between
price and price deal: price deals do not have a uniform effect
across brands but a different effect depending on the price
level of the brand. Specifically, for a high-priced brand, we
found a negative effect of price deals on behavioral
intentions (brand equity, brand loyalty, and purchase
intention). On the contrary, for a low-priced brand, we found
a positive effect of price deals on each of the same behavioral
intention variables.

Research limitations/implications: Future research needs to study different types of products and
samples to enhance the external validity of the findings. Real
market data that recorded price changes and price deal
offerings over time need to be examined to confirm the
findings of the study.
Practical implications:

A managerial implication is that high-priced brands should
avoid price deals whereas low-priced brands could benefit
from price deals.

Social implications:

When the findings are extended to the public-sector or
governmental services, providing costly services at a
discounted price (e.g., universal healthcare) may not be
welcome as that policy is likely to make fellow citizens
underestimate the value of the services and doubt the quality.

Originality/value:

This study is very original because it does not repeat any past
research, but taps into a problem not previously investigated.
The value of the study is very straightforward to brand and
promotional managers.

Keywords:

Price, price deal, brand equity, brand loyalty, purchase
intention, luxury brand, and interaction.

Classification:

Research paper
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Interactions between Price and Price Deal
Many studies found a negative effect of price deals and a positive effect of price on
consumers’ behavioral intentions, but little research has examined the interactive effect of price
and price deals. Consequently it would be very important to study how price and price deals
interact to affect behavioral intentions. The result will provide insight into how to use price
deals. Thee purpose of this research is to develop and test a conceptual model of the interactive
effect between price and price deals on behavioral intentions, which are measured in brand
equity, brand loyalty, and purchase intention.
Price Deals versus Price
Price deals are found to negatively affect behavioral intentions (Aaker 1991; Yoo,
Donthu, and Lee 2000). For example, Grewal et al. (1998) and Chen et al. (1998) report that
price deals, while often generating traffic in a retail store, cause consumers to discount the
perceived quality and the internal reference price of the brand. Other studies find that price deals
lead to lower quality perceptions (e.g., Blattberg and Neslin 1990; Dodson, Tybout, and Sternthal
1978; Rao and Monroe 1988). Angel and Manuel (2005) also find that price deals are negatively
correlated with perceived brand quality and image. Winer (1986) argues that lowering prices, for
example, through price deals, can place brands in danger because that creates confusion among
consumers and that the instability and variability of prices produce a perception of unstable
brand quality.
On the contrary, the level of price is found to positively affect behavioral intentions
mainly because price establishes image of the brand in the eyes of the consumers (Aaker 1991;
Yoo, Donthu, and Lee 2000; Rao and Monroe 1989). In a consumer’s heuristics, a high (low)
price connotes a high (low) quality and image. For a conceptual convenience, this study
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identifies two types of products by price: high-priced brands and low-priced brands. High-priced
brands are brands on the market whose image is seen as the key factor. Consumers of these
brands often purchase them mainly for image and are willing to pay a premium price for their
perceived high quality and status, which make them price-inelastic (Bolton 1989; Fok et al.
2006). Low-priced brands tend to be purchased for utilitarian value, with the consumer relying
on the perceived value for price. Consumers would typically look for low prices of these brands
or substitutes to get the best value. Low-image brands tend to be more price elastic, as the
driving factor for their purchase is seen in value by consumers. Table 1 summarizes the findings
from selected literature related to the effect of price deals and price.
**************************
Put Table 1 about here
**************************
The Interaction between Price Deals and Price
Literature shows that price has a positive impact on behavioral intentions while price
deals have a negative impact. One question arises: How will the positive effect of price interact
with the negative effect of price deals? As noted earlier, however, there has been little research
that examined the interactive effect of price deals and price on behavioral intentions. Therefore,
it will be interesting to learn how the interaction would behave. If the interaction exists, the main
effect of either price or price deal would be very weak because the effect of one of them would
depend on the other. As shown in Table 1, not a small number of studies found any main effect
for either price or price deal. Such insignificant effects provide a ground to pay attention to the
existence of the interactive effect.
Ratneshwar et al. (2001) argue that personal purchase goals can have a strong influence
on how consumers categorize and compare products. It should be noted that consumers buy
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high-priced brands (typically luxury goods), driven by either social-adjunctive attitudes that seek
design, image, or social status or value-expression attitudes that seek product durability or
quality (Wilcox et al. 2009). On the contrary, consumers buy low-priced brands mainly for
transaction value, that is, how much they obtain for the price they pay. Therefore, behavioral
intentions would depend on the consumer purchase goal. When the goal can be satisfied,
consumers will buy the brand, become loyal to the brand, and feel more value by the brand
name. If the purchase goal cannot be satisfied, consumers are likely to buy or switch to another
brand that would satisfy their purchase goal. But the goal is not uniform across brands. It must be
different between high- and low-priced brands. Consumers will seek value for low-priced brands,
whereas they will seek quality or status for high-priced brands. Therefore, with price deals
offered, consumers will be momentarily attracted to the increased value for low-priced brands by
the higher transaction utility (Yoo et al. 2000). However, price deals would lower the perception
on quality and status especially for high-priced brands (Grewal et al. 1998). Fok et al. (2006)
also find that brands with relatively frequent price deals are often considered of lower quality
than similar, rarely promoted brands.
Conspicuousness (willingness to spend a great amount of money to demonstrate their
social status) also plays an important role on brand purchases. Wilcox et al. (2009) find that
high-priced brands are highly related to consumer conspicuousness. When price deals lower the
final price they pay, conspicuousness will be damaged, which makes consumers unhappy.
Similarly, consumers pursue exclusivity (they want to be the only buyers who belong to the elite
society) from high-priced brands. Price deals will unfortunately decrease exclusivity, which
lowers the attractiveness of high-priced brands. In contrast, low-priced brand buyers are not
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concerned with conspicuousness or exclusivity desires. Instead, they would be pleased with the
increased value garnered by the price deals.
In summary, the consumer’s goals for high-priced brands and low-priced brands are
completely different. Thus, consumers looking for quality, status, self expression, and image will
gravitate toward high-priced brands to fulfill their goals, the achievement of which can be
signaled through promotional messages of conspicuousness and exclusivity. But the consumers
looking for price value will be attracted to low-priced brands to satisfy their goals. Price deals
can work positively or negatively for the purchase goals. Specifically, price deals are expected to
have a positive effect on low-priced brands because they provide transaction value, the major
purchase goal towards low-priced brands. On the contrary, they are likely to have a negative
effect on high-priced brands because they do not serve, but rather damage, quality and status
perceptions, the major purchase goal toward high-priced brands.
Therefore, we hypothesize as follows:
H1: Price deals decrease consumers’ behavioral intentions toward a high-priced brand.
H2: Price deals increase consumers’ behavioral intentions toward a low-priced brand.
In this study, behavioral intentions were represented by brand equity, brand loyalty, and
purchase intention. These specific measures were selected for three reasons. First, among many
other marketing activities, price and price deal are found to particularly affect actual product
purchases. From this understanding, it would be ideal to measure consumers’ behavioral
intentions toward the brand rather than cognition or attitudes. Second, they can be interpreted as
a proxy measure of sales and financial success in the market. Third, in particular, brand equity
and loyalty belong to the group of the best marketing performance metrics (Yoo, Donthu, and
Lee 2000).
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METHODOLOGY
Experimental Design
The purpose of this study was to test the interactive effect of price deals and price.
Specifically, we wanted to measure how behavioral intentions are affected for a high-priced
brand and a low-priced brand when the price deal is offered. To test the research hypotheses, we
created a two (price level: high versus low; between) by two (price deal: absent versus 40% off;
between) experimental design, under which we conducted two studies: Study 1 involved two real,
existing brands and Study 2 created a fictitious brand. Study 1 aimed at obtaining high external
validity, whereas Study 2 was expected to guarantee high internal validity.
Study 1
We selected a Prada handbag as a high-priced brand and a Mossimo handbag as a lowpriced brand. These two brands, available in stores, showed a significantly different price level to
each other. Price deals had two categories: absent versus 40% off. We felt that 40% off would
represent a price deal because retailers offer 40% price deals on average for handbag brands
(Klonick 2008). We chose handbags for women because the gender we surveyed (female) was
well aware of the product category. We conducted a pilot study to examine female consumers’
use of handbags, awareness of the brands available in the market, and their involvement with the
product. We felt that a handbag would be a good fit for the survey based on its involvement,
usage, and brand awareness levels.
Each survey of the two-by-two scenarios was presented to participants in a print
advertisement format. Each ad, shown in a letter-size paper, consisted of the logo, the photo, the
copy message, and a price deal amount for the focal brand. The font size for the ad copy and the
photo size of each brand remained the same, and the copy on the ads was carefully modified
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from the original ads so as to give a realistic and professional sense to participants. Two
examples of the ads are shown in Appendix 1.
Procedure
Because the product was a female handbag, we decided to ask female college students to
participate. A total of 80 college female students taking undergraduate- or graduate-level
business classes voluntarily participated for a minimal extra credit. Their age ranged from 19 to
42, with an average of 23.40 and standard deviation of 3.94. Their working hours per week
ranged from 0 to 55, with an average of 20.08 and standard deviation of 14.39. Participants
showed no significant difference in purchase experiences between Prada and Mossimo (chisquare = 1.25, df=1, p = 0.26). The four versions of the survey were randomly assigned to
participants. Each survey consisted of four pages: a brief description of the study and a stimulus
ad on the first page, manipulation checking questions and effect measures on the second and
third pages, and demographic measures on the last page. Participants were requested to respond
to every question of the survey. The ad was shown in a smaller scale as a reminder on the top of
the second and third pages. Through this procedure, we collected twenty responses per survey
version. The price perception, when measured by one question, “The final price of the above
brand is high,” was used to check the manipulations. It was significantly different for the price
manipulation: Prada (M = 5.72) versus Mossimo (M = 3.50) (t = 5.80, df=78, p < 0.0001) and for
the price deal manipulation: no deal (M = 4.90) versus 40% off (M = 4.32) (t = 1.27, df=78, p <
0.10).
Measures
As the effect of two independent variables (the level of price and the level of price deal),
behavioral intentions were measured threefold: brand equity, brand loyalty, and purchase
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intention. Brand equity is defined as “the difference in consumer choice between the focal
branded product and the unbranded product, given the same level of product features” (Yoo et al.
2000). Brand loyalty is defined as “a deeply held commitment to rebuy or repatronize a preferred
product or service consistently in the future, despite situational influences and marketing efforts
having the potential to cause switching behavior” (Oliver 1997). Like purchase intention that is a
popular and direct indicator of actual purchase of the future, both brand equity and brand loyalty
are concerned with brand choice behaviors showing the extent to which a consumer shows
favorable responses to the focal brand (Chaudhuri and Holbrook 2001; Grover and Srinivasan
1992). Therefore, these three outcomes were deemed appropriate as performance measures of
price and price deal stimuli.
The measures of the three types of effect were adopted from Yoo et al. (2000) and
anchored on 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree. The detailed measure items are
reported in Appendix 2. Brand equity, measured by four items, showed reliability of 0.93. Brand
loyalty, measured by three items, earned reliability of 0.87. And purchase intention, measured by
three items, showed reliability of 0.96. We also measured product involvement (reliability of
0.87) by adopting four items from Zaichkowsky’s (1994) scale, which allowed a participant to
express how important and relevant to her the handbag is. Product involvement was included in
analysis for the purpose of controlling participants’ product experiences and knowledge levels
and estimating the pure effect of the independent variables. Product involvement is known to
affect consumer purchase activities, representing the perceived relevance of the product category
to the individual consumer (Quester and Lim 2003; Slama and Tashchian 1985). Richins and
Bolch (1986) observe that consumers with high product involvement find the product interesting
and occupy the consumer’s thoughts. Quester and Lim (2003) insist that this interest in the
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product category may arise from the consumer’s perception that the product class meets
important values and goals. Thus, product involvement must be identified and controlled in
evaluating the behavioral intentions for both high-priced and low-priced brands.
Result
Multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) was conducted to test the effect of two
independent variables (price and price deal) and their interaction, taking product involvement as
a covariate, on three dependent variables (purchase intention, brand loyalty, and brand equity).
For the factorial design, the multivariate test for the assumption of homoscedasticity was
insignificant (Box’s M = 18.40, p = 0.52), failing to reject the null hypothesis of homogeneity of
variance-covariance matrices. In the Levene’s univariate test for each dependent variable, brand
loyalty and purchase intention showed an insignificant result (p > 0.10), confirming
homoscedasticity, but as for brand equity, the significance level was 0.05, indicating possible
heteroscedasticity.
The multivariate test results by MANCOVA clearly showed no main effect of either price
(p = 0.92) or price deal (p = 0.25), but a significant interactive effect (p < 0.05), supporting the
research hypothesis that the effect of price deals depends on the price level of a focal brand.
Figure 1 visually shows the interaction effect between price and price deal on three behavioral
intention variables. The interaction was a classic case as represented by the X-shaped crossed
lines. In other words, the effect of price deal was reversed at two different levels of price. For the
low-priced brand, Mossimo, presence of price deal was much more favorable than was absence
of it by increasing each behavioral intention index. On the other hand, for the high-priced brand,
Prada, absence of price deal was more favorable than was presence of it. Therefore, the effect of
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price deal depends on at what level the brand is priced, which supports H1 and H2 at the overall
behavioral intention level.
*******************************
Figure 1 about here
*******************************
As there was a strong interaction effect, the main effect of price deal was invalid, which
means that it is not possible to expect similar price deal effects across brands, which was also not
found in Gupta’s (1988) study. Because of the significant interaction effect, univariate tests
(ANCOVA) were conducted to examine the combined impact of price and price deal on the
individual dependent variables. As shown in Table 2, it turned out that there was a strong
interaction effect between price and price deal in every dependent variable: brand equity (F =
6.36, p < 0.01), brand loyalty (F = 6.33, p < 0.01), and purchase intention (F = 7.51, p < 0.01).
This result supports H1 and H2 at the individual behavioral intention level. The effect size of the
interaction was 0.08 for both brand equity and loyalty and 0.09 for purchase intention, as shown
by η2. However, neither price nor price deal, whose p-value was higher than 0.30, had a
significant main effect on any dependent variable. It is noteworthy that product involvement
showed a significant effect for brand equity (p < 0.10) and brand loyalty (p < 0.05).
**************************
Put Table 2 about here
**************************
Study 2
Using real brands, Study 1 clearly showed that with a low price brand the price
promotion had favorable effects on behavioral intentions, whereas with a high-priced brand it
had unfavorable effects. Despite such impressive findings, however, Study 1 cannot be free from
criticism. Specifically, in Study 1, in an effort to increase the realism by using existing brands,
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price was tied to the brand name and the ad content. Therefore, the effect of price could have
been confounded with that of brand name and/or ad content. As a result, the very question,
“Does price level interact with the presence versus absence of a price promotion?” was not
answered yet in a sense. That was why Study 2 was designed. In Study 2, two factors only, price
and price deal, were manipulated without changing anything else. In particular, to remove
preexisting perceptions on any brand, we created a fictitious brand and a fairly neutral ad content
such that the brand could be viewed as either a low- or a high-priced alternative. Both low- and
high-priced products had the same brand name, called BSM, and the same model name, Unisex
G316W Sunglasses, both of which were fictitious. We selected unisex sunglasses to be able to
study both gender types. Two specific price levels ($24.95 as low and $274.95 as high) were
selected because they represented the 90th and 10th percentile of the market prices, respectively,
among about 36,000 sunglasses models. As in Study 1, we hired the same two levels of price
deal: absent versus 40% off. We took 40% off as a price deal because that was the most popular
price deal for sunglasses. We clearly informed participants of the regular prices in all 4
conditions: (1) high price/no discount; (2) high price/discount; (3) low price/no discount; (4) low
price/discount. Then, the reduced price was shown within the two discount conditions. Appendix
3 exhibits two of the four ads conveying the experimental design.
Procedure
Four versions of the survey (2 levels of price, between, x 2 levels of price deal, between)
were developed in the same manner and structure reported for Study 1. The surveys were
randomly assigned to participants, each of whom was exposed to one version only. A total of 119
undergraduate and graduate business students (60 females and 59 males) voluntarily participated
in Study 2 for a minimal extra credit. They were 28.97 years old on average. They owned one to
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four pairs of sunglasses (2.13 on average). Across four versions of the survey, participants
showed no significant difference in age (F = 0.15, p = 0.93), the number of owned pairs of
sunglasses (F = 1.29, p = 0.28), the price that they were willing to pay if they would buy a pair of
sunglasses (F = 0.99, p = 0.40), product involvement with sunglasses (F = 0.36, p = 0.79), and
gender (chi-square = 0.59, df=1, p = 0.90).
To check the manipulation, we developed a three-item scale of perceived price and a
three-item scale of perceived price deal in a 7-point scale: reliability was 0.95 and 0.86,
respectively (see the scales in Appendix 2). Price perception was significantly different between
low (M = 2.23) versus high (M = 6.34) price scenarios (t = 24.95, df=117, p < 0.0001), and price
deal perception was also significantly different between no deal (M = 2.94) versus 40% off (M =
5.16) scenarios (t = 13.79, df=117, p < 0.0001). As in Study 1, the effect of two independent
variables (price and price deal) was measured in three types of behavioral intentions. The items
were measured in a 7-point scale (1 = Strongly Disagree and 7 = Strongly Agree) and reliability
was highly satisfactory: 0.88 for brand equity, 0.81 for brand loyalty, and 0.95 for purchase
intention. Factor analysis of the items of the three measures produced a clear three-factor
structure, which explained 81.5% of total variances: 28.7% for brand equity, 27.0% for purchase
intention, and 25.8% for brand loyalty.
Result
Four groups (two levels of price x two levels of price deal) had a statistically equivalent
sample size to one another, ranging from 26 to 36 (chi-square = 2.04, df=3, p = 0.56). The result
of MANCOVA was conducted to simultaneously test the effect of price and price deal and their
interaction, taking product involvement as a covariate, on three dependent variables (purchase
intention, brand loyalty, and brand equity). Unlike in Study 1, the main effect of both price (p <
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0.05) and price deal (p < 0.01) was significant. Nevertheless, the interaction effect of price and
price deal was also significant at the 0.10 level, which warrants the investigation of univariate
tests at each dependent variable level. Table 3 reports the results of ANCOVA, which identified
a significant interaction effect between price and price deal in brand equity (F = 3.50, p < 0.05)
and brand loyalty (F = 3.00, p < 0.01), while having no significant main effect of either price or
price deal on these two dependent variables. Figure 2 exhibits the same X-shaped interaction
effects as found in Study 1. However, the interaction was directionally supported for purchase
intention (F = 1.26, p = 0.17), although its shape was also cross-over as shown in Figure 2c.
Therefore, H1 and H2 were clearly supported for two dependent variables (brand equity and
loyalty) but directionally supported for the third variable (purchase intention). The effect size of
the interaction was 0.03 for brand equity and 0.05 for brand loyalty, but just 0.01 for purchase
intention. As found in Study 1, however, according to ANCOVA, neither price nor price deal (p
> 0.10) showed a significant main effect in any dependent variable in Study 2. This indicates that
the effect of price deal is opposite, depending on the price level of the brand. For the low-priced
brand, presence of price deal increased behavioral intentions more than the absence of it. On the
other hand, for the high-priced brand, absence of price deal increased the behavioral intentions
than the presence of it. In conclusion, the effect of price deal depends on the level at which the
brand is priced. It was significant for brand equity and loyalty, but directional for purchase
intention. Study 1 and Study 2 together confirm that the effect of price deal depends on the level
of the original price and that price deal should be encouraged for a low-priced product but
discouraged for a high-priced product.
*************************************
Put Table 3 and Figure 2 about here
*************************************
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CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Unlike previous research, this study examined the effect of price deals in the context of
price level, using an experimental design. Both Study 1 (two existing brands) and Study 2 (a
fictitious brand) confirmed that price deals do not have a uniform effect across brands but a
different effect depending on the price level of a brand. Depending on the price level, the
consumer’s behavioral intentions were quite different when exposed to price deals. Specifically,
for a high-priced brand, we observed that price deals have a negative effect on brand equity,
brand loyalty, and purchase intention. On the contrary, for a low-priced brand, we observed a
positive effect on each of the same behavioral intention variables. This study expands our
understanding of consumer behavior toward a brand when consumers have to process the
information of price and price deals simultaneously. We found a significant behavioral
difference when there a price deal exists in comparison to no-price deal. However, the direction
of the behavior was reverse depending on the level of price.
Managerial Implications
The findings of this research suggest that marketers have to rethink the promotional
strategies for their brands. For instance, Ghodeswar (2008) argues that brands evolve over time
and require a lot of time and resources to construct a brand image and build an identity. So he
insists that each single promotional message needs to be carefully designed as it can contribute to
building or destroying the brand. Upshaw (1985) also argues that brand identity hinges on who
consumers are as individuals, the environment they live in, and the signal sent from the brand
itself. For instance, high-priced brands (typically, luxury brands) target those who see image as
their goal of purchase. To impress these consumers, marketers invent a unique promotional
strategy that shapes the image, which could be the function of uniqueness of the product in the
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competitive market that tries to defy the image. However, the moment the high-priced brand is
on sale through price promotions that uniqueness and image can be damaged, and consumers’
behavioral intentions diminish because the brand does not satisfy the goal of its target market
any more. For low-priced brands, the opposite is the case. The goal of the consumer is the pursuit
of value for the money, which can be much more successful with price deals, consequently
increasing the behavioral intentions.
High-priced brands are seen as image-related goods. They have been successful in
developing their own unique image, which was a formed through not only physical quality but
also advertising activities. Prada, for instance, promotes “Hollywood stars use it why not you?
Be noticed, Be admired.” This message clearly satisfies the goal of consumers, which is to
possess image and status. Thus, consumers make a purchase. However, the very moment there is
a price deal offered on Prada, even with the same advertisement text, the behavioral intentions
become weakened. The price deal clearly obstructs the consumer’s purchase goal of image,
decreasing the purchase intension along with brand equity and brand loyalty, because it sends
negative vibes toward high-priced image brands. On the contrary, low-priced brands are seen to
serve functional goals. Their consumers are price-sensitive and typically go for value. A lowerprice tag, thanks to a price deal, justifies their purchase. Therefore, the implication of the
findings is obvious that high-priced brands should avoid price deals, whereas low-priced brands
could benefit from price deals.
We admit that our study does not provide enough detailed insights into many related
issues such as whether price deals should be completely stopped for high-priced brands, whether
occasional price deals can be acceptable for high-priced brands, what dollar-amount price level is
objectively or subjectively high enough in defining high-priced brands, and what percent or
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dollar-amount price deal can make a difference in each of the high- and low-priced brands.
Nevertheless, it seems to be a reasonable conclusion that price deals should be avoided, if
possible, if image and status, rather than value or functionality, is a primary positioning of the
brand. On the contrary, price deals can be relatively freely used for a brand which pursues
competition based on value for money or functionality.
Limitations and Future Research
Overcoming the weaknesses of the study would be the directions of future research. First,
our experimental design could be stronger. Specifically, we selected a 40% sale to measure the
effect of a price deal. Although the discount rate was derived from the industry’s common
practice, it could strengthen the confidence in the findings if a range of various rates is examined.
Likewise, we relied on two product categories (handbag and sunglasses) and one type of sample
(undergraduate and graduate business students). Future research needs to study different types of
products and samples to enhance the external validity of the findings.
Second, our sample consist of consumers of the US, but the reaction to price and price
deals might vary across nations as the same marketing strategy is often received differently in
different countries. Likewise, individuals’ personal cultural tendencies might show similar
differences in evaluating marketing stimuli. For instance, Yoo (2009) found collectivism has a
significant effect on brand loyalty and equity. In his study, regardless of the national identity,
collectivist individuals showed higher brand loyalty and equity across brands than did
individualist individuals. Therefore, whether the findings of our study are consistent across
national cultures or individual-level cultural tendencies needs to be examined. Along with this
line, the role of sociodemographics (e.g., personal income, marital status, employment status,
and education level) and psychological characteristics (e.g., perceived social class, vanity,
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materialism, life style, and self-esteem) needs to be studied in processing price and price deal
combinations.
Third, the study was based on experiments. Although an experiment is a reliable method
to test causality, it lacks reality. Thus, future research needs to examine real market data that
have recorded price changes and price deal offerings at the brand level across product categories
over many time periods. Related to this, when studying real data, competition needs to be
included because the interactive effect of price and price deals must be different depending on
how competing brands act and react.
Fourth, in investigating the interactive effect of price and price deal, this study observed
behavioral intentions as dependent variables. However, future research needs to also pay
attention to mediating variables to show more details of the procedural mechanism of how price
interacts with price deal. Then researchers and marketers could discover strategic insights into
how to intervene in the middle of the procedure to generate more favorable outcomes when using
price promotions.
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TABLE 1
Selected Literature Review on the Effect of Price and Price Deals

a

Dependent Variable

Effect a

Sources

Effect of Price on:
 Brand choice
 Brand equity
 Brand loyalty
 Likelihood of permanent price reduction
 Likelihood of regular price inflation
 Perceived quality
 Significance of savings
 Brand choice
 Promotional price elasticity
 Quantity
 Perceived quality
 Perceived discount
 Promotional cross-price elasticity
 Purchase intention
 Purchase intention change

Positive
Positive
Positive
Positive
Positive
Positive
Positive
Negative
Negative
Negative
Mixed
n.s.b
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.

Lemon et al. (2002)
Aaker (1991); Yoo et al. (2000)
Yoo et al. (2000)
Chen et al. (1998)
Chen et al. (1998)
Grewal et al. (1998); Rao and Monroe (1989); Yoo et al. (2000)
Chen et al. (1998)
Jedidi et al. (1999)
Karande and Kumar (1995)
Jedidi et al. (1999)
Bolton (1989); Fok et al. (2006); Wilcox et al. (2009)
Gupta and Cooper (1992)
Karande and Kumar (1995)
Chen et al. (1998)
Gupta and Cooper (1992)

Effect of Price Deal on:
 Brand choice
 Forward buying
 Immediate effect
 Likelihood of permanent price reduction
 Likelihood of regular price inflation
 Long-term effect
 Number of transactions
 Perceived price
 Perceived value
 Purchase intention
 Store traffic
 Brand equity
 Brand loyalty
 Effort to find promotion
 Estimates of average brand prices
 Internal reference price
 Loyalty to tour operator
 Perceived monetary price
 Perceived quality

Positive
Positive
Positive
Positive
Positive
Positive
Positive
Positive
Positive
Positive
Positive
Negative
Negative
Negative
Negative
Negative
Negative
Negative
Negative










Mixed
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.

Jedidi et al. (1999)
Helsen and Schmittlein (1992)
Fok et al. (2006)
Chen et al. (1998)
Chen et al. (1998)
Fok et al. (2006)
Lam et al. (2001)
Sheng et al. (2007)
Grewal et al. (1998)
Chen et al. (1998)
Lam et al. (2001)
Yoo et al. (2000)
Yoo et al. (2000)
Campo and Yagüe (2008)
Alba et al. (1999)
Grewal et al. (1998)
Campo and Yagüe (2008)
Campo and Yagüe (2008)
Angel and Manuel (2005); Blattberg and Neslin (1990); Dodson
et al. (1978); Fok et al (2006); Rao and Monroe (1988); Sheng et
al. (2007);Winer (1986) Yoo et al. (2000)
Lam et al. (2001)
Lam et al. (2001)
Nijs et al. (2001)
Grewal et al. (1998)
Jedidi et al. (1999)
Campo and Yagüe (2008)
Nijs et al. (2001)
Chen et al. (1998)

Store sales
Front traffic
Long-run effect
Perceived quality
Quantity of purchase
Satisfaction
Short-run effect
Significance of savings

Direction of effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable and b Not significant.
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TABLE 2
Study 1. Univariate Tests for Group Differences in Dependent Variables
Sum of
Squares

df

Mean
Square

Brand Equity

7.92

1

Brand Loyalty

10.76

Purchase Intention

Source

Dependent Variable

Product
Involvement

Price

Price Deal

Price x Price Deal

F

p-value

7.92

2.98

0.09

1

10.76

4.18

0.04

3.77

1

3.77

1.18

0.28

Brand Equity

0.00

1

0.00

0.00

0.98

Brand Loyalty

0.27

1

0.27

0.10

0.75

Purchase Intention

0.35

1

0.35

0.11

0.74

Brand Equity

2.95

1

2.95

1.11

0.30

Brand Loyalty

0.26

1

0.26

0.10

0.75

Purchase Intention

0.42

1

0.42

0.13

0.72

Brand Equity

16.92

1

16.92

6.36

0.01

Brand Loyalty

16.30

1

16.30

6.33

0.01

Purchase Intention

24.04

1

24.04

7.51

0.01

23

TABLE 3
Study 2. Univariate Tests for Group Differences in Dependent Variables
Sum of
Squares

df

Mean
Square

F

p-value

Brand Equity

1.56

1

1.56

2.03

0.15

Brand Loyalty

1.18

1

1.18

2.70

0.10

Purchase Intention

0.27

1

0.27

0.40

0.52

Brand Equity

1.46

1

1.46

1.90

0.17

Brand Loyalty

0.58

1

0.58

1.31

0.25

Purchase Intention

0.01

1

0.01

0.01

0.89

Brand Equity

1.48

1

1.48

1.93

0.16

Brand Loyalty

1.14

1

1.14

2.59

0.11

Purchase Intention

0.38

1

0.38

0.56

0.45

Brand Equity

3.50

1

3.50

4.54

0.03

Brand Loyalty

3.00

1

3.00

6.82

0.01

Purchase Intention

1.26

1

1.26

1.84

0.17

Source

Dependent Variable

Product
Involvement

Price

Price Deal

Price x Price Deal
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FIGURE 1
Study 1. Graphical Presentations of Interaction Effect between Price and Price Deals
1a. Effect on Brand Equity

1b. Effect on Brand Loyalty

1c. Effect on Purchase Intention
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FIGURE 2
Study 2. Graphical Presentations of Interaction Effect between Price and Price Deals
2a. Effect on Brand Equity

2b. Effect on Brand Loyalty

2c. Effect on Purchase Intention
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Appendix 1. Experimental Stimuli for Study 1 (Two Examples)

Example 1. The ad for a high-priced brand without a price deal

Example 2. The ad for a low-priced brand with a 40% off price deal
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Appendix 2. Measures of Constructs
Perceived price (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.95b)
• The final price (the actual price you should pay) is expensive.
• The final price is cheap. (reverse)
• The final price is high.
Perceived price deal (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.86b)
• XYZ is on great sale.
• The final price of XYZ is now much cheaper than the regular price.
• The final price makes me save a lot, compared to the regular price.
Brand equity (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.93a and 0.88b)
• It makes sense to by XYZ instead of any other brand, even if they are the same.
• Even if other brand has same features as XYZ, I would prefer to buy XYZ.
• If there is another brand as good as XYZ, I prefer to buy XYZ.
• If another brand is not different from XYZ in any way, it seems smarter to purchase XYZ.
Brand loyalty (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.87a and 0.81b)
• I consider myself loyal to XYZ.
• XYZ would be my first choice.
• I will not buy any other brand ABC if XYZ is available in the store.
Purchase intention (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.96 a and 0.95b)
• I will definitely purchase XYZ in the near future.
• I intend to purchase XYZ in the near future.
• It is likely that I will purchase XYZ in the near future.
Product involvement (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.87 a and 0.87b)
To me, ABC is:
• Unimportant
__ __ __ __ __ __ __
Important
• Irrelevant
__ __ __ __ __ __ __
Relevant
• Means nothing
__ __ __ __ __ __ __
Means a lot
• Worthless
__ __ __ __ __ __ __
Valuable
XYZ and ABC denote the focal brand and the product category, respectively; a Measured in Study 1; and b
Measured in Study 2.
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Appendix 3. Experimental Stimuli for Study 2 (Two Examples)

Example 1. The ad for a high-priced brand without a price deal

Example 2. The ad for a low-priced brand with a 40% off price deal
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